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A parking lot attendant drove a customer to her place of 
business, and, while returning the automobile to the parking lot, 
negligently struck the plaintiff, a pedestrian, who successfully re-
covered against the customer under the following Georgia statute: 
Every owner of a motor vehicle . . . shall be liable ... for injur-
ies . . . :resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor 
vehicle if ... used in the prosecution of the business (or) for the 
benefit of such owner. 
On appeal, Held: the statute violates due process because it might 
impose liability upon an owner whose automobile was operated 
without his consent or knowledge, express or implied. Frankel v. 
Cone, 214 Ga. 733, 107 S.E.2d 819 (1959) .1 
6 Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 ID. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945); Eder v. 
Rothamel, 202 Md. 189, 95 A.2d 860 (1952); 14 MD. L. REV. 151 (1954); 
Cf. Annot., £7 A.L.R.2d 999 (1959). 
7 Campbell v. Drozdowics, 243 Wis. 354, 10 N.W.2d 158 (1943), held 
that a husband's voluntary conveyance of his interest to land to 
his wife which they held in joint tenancy destroyed joint tenancy 
for all practical purposes including right of survivorship. 
s See 34 NEB. L. REV. 293 (1954). 
1 Noted in 10 MERCER L. REV. 338 (1959). 
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A statute is invalid if it makes an owner absolutely liable for 
the negligence of a thief,2 but this statute did not reach that far. 
It is very difficult to imagine a thief operating a stolen automobile 
for the owner's benefit, or in the prosecution of the owner's bus-
iness.3 
On the other hand, statutes imposing liability upon a car 
owner whose car is operated with his permission have been uni-
formly upheld.4 In a leading case,5 a resident of New Jersey 
loaned his automobile to another who drove to New York and 
there injured the plaintiff. Recovery was granted against the 
owner in a New Jersey court under a New York statute which 
predicated liability on the owner's permission, express or implied. 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed.6 
In the instant case the element of permission is present, yet 
the court struck down the statute as applied to a thief situation 
when the statute obviously did not reach it. Unfortunately, the 
court is not alone in this practice of invalidating statutes on hypo-
thetical facts. 
The Delaware court, for example, invalidated the Non-Resident 
Motor Vehicle Act because it might allow the state to notify a 
non-resident that process "will soon be made" on the Secretary of 
State even though the non-resident then before the court had 
been notified of process actually served.7 North Carolina struck 
down a tax statute because it might allow property to be re-valued 
without notice to owners in spite of the fact that notice had been 
2 This would be liability without fault; however the area of such liabil-
ity is growing. An owner may be lb.eld absolutely liable where his 
automobile is parked in violation of a city ordinance, Commonwealth 
v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934). An owner may be held 
absolutely liable if he leaves the keys in ignition, Ross v. Hartman, 
139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Florida has declared the automobile a 
"dangerous instrumentality,'' Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 
268 (1947), see note, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 412 (1952). See also PROS-
SER, TORTS, § 61 (2d ed. 1955). 
a Of course, one might argue that the owner benefited if his car were 
stolen, and seconds later a plane crashed where the car had been. 
4 See cases cited in 5A AM. JUR. Automobiles § 612 (1956). The liabil-
ity of an automobile owner for tlb.e negligence of third persons is dis-
cussed in 61 A.L.R. 867 (1929) and 53 A.L.R.2d 679 (1957). 
u Masci v. Young, 109 N.J.L. 453, 162 Atl. 623 (1932). 
6 Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933), noted in 47 HARV. L. REV. 349 
(1933), 18 MINN. L. REV. 350 (1933), and 12 TEX. L. REV. 87 (1933). 
7 Castelline v. Goldfine Truck Rental Serv., 48 Del. 550, 107 A.2d 915 
(1954), rev'd on other grounds, 49 Del. 155, 112 A.2d 840 (1955). 
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published in the local newspaper. "Whether future boards would 
be so kind is not certain."8 
Most courts refuse to indulge in this type of reasoning. For 
instance, a Connecticut court had before it a statute which imposed 
liability on a liquor vendor for any damage done by an intoxicated 
buyer. The court admitted that a vendor might be liable in a 
case where the damage and the intoxicatioh had no causal con-
nection, but such a possibility would not be considered when the 
facts did not require it.9 
The Nebraska cases, however, appear to adopt the practice 
illustrated by the Georgia, Delaware, and North Carolina cases 
above.10 In State v. Pocras,11 for example, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court invalidated an obscenity statute because the phrase "dispose 
of in any manner" might allow one to be imprisoned for turning 
obscene literature over to the police although no such situation 
was before the court.12 
This Nebraska tendency, and the instant case, accordingly 
raise a question concerning the constitutionality of a recent Ne-
braska statute: 13 
The owner of .any leased truck ... shall be jointly and severally 
liable with the lessee and the operator thereof for any injury ... 
resulting from the operation. 
If Nebraska continues its tendency to consider statutes in light 
of what might be done under them, this statute by the reasoning 
s Bowie v. Town of West Jefferson, 231 N.C. 408, 57 S.E.2d 369 ( 1950). 
Additional cases decided on hypothetical facts, Kentucky Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Bd. v. Jacobs, 269 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1954), Buchanan 
v. Health, 210 Ga. 410, 80 S.E.2d 393 (1954), and Demers v. P·eterson, 
197 Ore. 466, 254 P.2d 213 (1952). 
9 Pierce v. A1lbanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d ·606 (1957). See cases cited 
in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 97 at 349 (1956). The United States 
Supreme Court has had trouble in this area, see notes, 31 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 684 (1956), and 40 CORNELL L. Q. 195 (1955). An excel-
lant symposium on statutory construction is found in 3 V AND. L. REV. 
365 (1950). 
10 "It may be said that this is not the situation presented by the facts in 
this case, but it must be xemembered th.at the validity of the act does 
not depend upon what has been done, but upon what the act author-
izes and by what may be accomplished under it." Peter Kiewit Sons' 
Co. v. County 'of Douglas, 161 Neb. 93, 104, 72 N.W.2d 415, 423 (1955). 
-=--11 166 Neb. 642, 90 N.W.2d 263 (1958). 
12 See dissent, ibid. 
13 NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-7,135 (Supp. 1957). 
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in the instant case may be found unconstitutional.14 However, this 
tendency should not be continued. The court should return to 
an application of each statute to the actual facts of the case, leav-
ing interesting hypotheticals for the future. 
Richard E. Gee '62 
